

Reconciliation from the Perspective of Absolute Idealism



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Introduction

The question of reconciliation, whether with others or with oneself, represents one of the most challenging trials for consciousness. How can I reconcile with myself while being fully aware of the wrongs I have committed? How can reconciliation with others be envisioned, especially in the face of inhumane acts such as murder, rape, or exploitation? These empirical obstacles become even more critical in the present context, marked by armed conflicts and polarized opinions, where dogmatism seems to exclude any possibility of initiating a process of understanding and peace.

For those who have not yet done so, I strongly recommend reading my previous works: *Memoirs and Reflections on the Suspension of the Self*, which involves setting aside all personal inclinations, preconceived judgments, and desires to allow consciousness to access a deeper reality, followed by *Phenomenology of Evil*, which explores in depth the mechanisms of evil and their roots in human experience. Understanding these mechanisms forms an essential foundation for approaching the process of reconciliation that I propose here.

The term reconciliation comes from the Latin *reconciliatio*, itself derived from the verb *reconciliare*, which means “to restore, bring together again, reestablish friendship”. This verb is composed of two parts: *re-* (indicating repetition or return) *conciliare* (meaning “to make favorable,” “to unite,” “to bring into agreement”).

Reconciliation refers to the process by which individuals or groups in conflict restore peace, friendship, or a harmonious relationship after a disagreement or dispute. It often involves acts such as forgiveness, dialogue, or mutual understanding. In a broader sense, reconciliation can also refer to harmonizing divergent viewpoints or restoring balance after a period of tension. This process can be: Bilateral, when both parties engage in reconciliation, Unilateral, when one party alone chooses to undergo an internal transformation.

Thus, reconciliation can occur on both a personal level (between two individuals) and a collective level (between groups, communities, or nations), with the goal of restoring affection for oneself and others. It can also take on a more metaphysical or philosophical meaning, presenting itself as a quest to overcome obstacles to unity and harmony, whether they manifest as conceptual oppositions or internal moral conflicts.

This work does not claim to offer miraculous solutions, nor even exhaustive answers, but rather proposes a personal exploration of a mental disposition—that of neutrality or the “suspension of the self” as a prerequisite for reconciliation. This attitude requires a temporary renunciation of one’s certainties, beliefs, and emotional attachments. Though frustrating, this suspension is necessary to free reflection and overcome the illusions of the self, which obstruct reconciliation. This effort of revision and inner transformation is crucial

for understanding reality, for both empirical and intelligible aspects—since it is through a shared recognition of reality that reconciliation becomes possible. To write this monograph, in addition to the practice of suspension, I adopted the practice of transference, with the goal of making this theme more accessible, while addressing reconciliation with a lighter spirit, imbued with serenity, even joy. Despite the inherent difficulty of the topic, which must be confronted without evasion, and the initial discomfort it may provoke in challenging inclinations toward resentment, reconciliation ultimately proves to be a path toward harmony and profound humanization.

As for perspectives, I draw inspiration from the answers proposed by Universal Humanism, particularly through the work of Silo, as well as from the idealist philosophies of Plato, Kant, and Hegel, whose ideas have profoundly shaped contemporary humanism. Structured in an ascending approach, my argument starts from the empirical experience of reconciliation, gradually moving toward its conceptual essence, by exploring the mental obstacles that prevent one from loving both the other and oneself.

Interest of This Reflection

This work rethinks the nature of conflicts not as failures but as necessary steps toward deeper unification. It offers a framework for reflection where reconciliation is not synonymous with the erasure of tensions, but with their integration into a new and richer synthesis. This perspective offers insights not only for personal understanding but also for collective reconciliation, emphasizing the role of dialectical processes in transforming individuals and society.

Summary

This essay explores reconciliation through the lens of absolute idealism, drawing on philosophical and personal reflections. By examining concepts such as consciousness, freedom, and dialectics, it demonstrates that reconciliation is not just an action but a dynamic process in which internal and external conflicts play a fundamental role. The individual, often confronted with psychological and empirical conflicts, journeys toward a deeper understanding of themselves and the world through a process of uncovering the immutable schemas of the spirit, gradually revealed through lived experiences.

By comparing various philosophical theories, particularly those of Kant, Hegel, and Silo, the author argues that reconciliation is not merely an individual path but also a metaphysical one, where the unification of being and the world is achieved through the recognition of consciousness as the primary cause of the universe. This recognition enables individuals to transcend the limits of sensory matter and awaken to a more essential and transcendent understanding of existence.

Overview of the Dialectic

The dialectic, as developed in this work, is a dynamic process that guides consciousness on its path toward reconciliation and self-understanding. It relies on the constant interaction between apparent opposites—thesis and antithesis—that, rather than remaining fixed in conflict, evolve into a synthesis. This process of overcoming contradictions allows consciousness to rise and progressively uncover deeper truths.

At the individual level, the dialectic takes shape through internal struggles, contradictory experiences, and ideal aspirations that confront reality. Each confrontation between ideals and realities results in a new synthesis, enabling the individual to better understand their own nature and that of the universe. This process, far from being a simple linear evolution, functions as a gradual unveiling of structures already present but previously hidden in human experience, much like an archaeologist uncovering buried truths.

At the heart of this reflection lies the idea that consciousness itself, through this dialectical movement, is the primary cause of reality, and that conflicts, far from being obstacles, contribute to this dynamic of reconciliation and unification of the individual with themselves and with the world.

1. The Dialectic of the Positive Concept of Reconciliation and Its Negative in Empirical and Psychological Conditions

There are situations where reconciliation is difficult but still seems feasible, and others where it appears impossible. Take, for instance, a soldier confronted with such intense violence and danger that one can ostensibly understand how extreme conditions could push them to inhumane reactions, such as committing a war crime. From the comfort of a socially protected and peaceful environment, it is relatively easy to judge and condemn the violent behaviors of those directly faced with daily violence. But, in the same situation, would I have acted differently? To explore this question, I propose a thought experiment that immerses us in their reality. In this regard, I will refer to the war film *Saving Private Ryan*, which highlights two essential issues.

The Cause of the Empirical Context

The first, more explicit issue raises the delicate question of the "lesser evil," a key concept in consequentialism. I have long rejected this approach, as it compels me to consider, in exceptional situations, temporarily extinguishing my humanity by violating the principle of the "Golden Rule": "Don't do to others what you don't want done to you" or "Treat others as you wish to be treated."

In *Saving Private Ryan*, there is a scene where a small unit, after neutralizing an enemy machine gun nest, suffers the loss of one of their men. They then capture a German soldier and face a moral dilemma. Their mission does not allow them to take prisoners. Some soldiers want to execute him, as releasing him might allow him to rejoin enemy forces and take up arms against them. However, executing the prisoner would constitute a war crime. This scene highlights the conflict between ethics and military necessity under extreme conditions.

This scene perfectly illustrates the tension between military necessity and universal moral principles, raising the question of the lesser evil, which lies at the heart of consequentialism. The soldiers must decide whether it is better to commit a crime by executing a prisoner to potentially save lives or to uphold moral principles, even at the risk of jeopardizing their mission's safety. This type of moral dilemma, where the consequences of actions seem to take precedence over ethical principles, directly reflects the philosophy of consequentialism.

Consequentialism is a moral theory that suggests the morality of an action depends entirely on its outcomes. In other words, what makes an action good or bad is not the intention behind it or adherence to a moral rule, but the effects it produces. If an action leads to good outcomes, it is considered morally acceptable, and if it leads to bad outcomes, it is deemed immoral—even if the initial intent was moral.

One of the most well-known forms of consequentialism is utilitarianism, notably developed by John Stuart Mill in *Utilitarianism* (1861). This theory holds that the best action is the one that generates the most well-being or happiness for the greatest number of people. This means that, in any given situation, it is necessary to evaluate all possible options and choose the one with the best overall consequences. For example, if lying can save a life, a consequentialist might consider that lie justified because it produces a greater positive outcome than the act itself.

In summary, consequentialism focuses on the results of actions, always aiming to maximize the good or minimize negative consequences.

While I consider this philosophy courageous because it addresses very real moral dilemmas, I also find it insufficient to justify controversial actions. Uncertainty remains, as consequences are not always predictable. Furthermore, reconciliation is not solely based on outcomes but also on the sincerity of the intentions of the parties involved. Acts of reconciliation, such as apologies or reparations, must be genuine and authentic. Consequentialism, by focusing only on what is "beneficial," might encourage calculated

actions without addressing sincerity or the transformation of human relationships. True reconciliation requires a profound moral commitment, far beyond mere consequences.

Additionally, this philosophy is often poorly refuted by its opposing argument of the "perfect solution," which is, in fact, a fallacy. This reasoning flaw involves rejecting a solution simply because it is not perfect or does not solve all problems 100%. It implies that if a solution has flaws or limitations, it does not deserve to be adopted. This poses a problem because, in many situations, perfect solutions do not exist. It is often better to adopt an imperfect but effective solution rather than do nothing at all. For instance, rejecting a political reform that significantly improves a situation on the grounds that it does not resolve all problems is a typical example of this fallacy. In summary, the "perfect solution" fallacy in political contexts can lead to rejecting useful options under the pretext that they are not ideal, whereas a pragmatic and realistic approach can often prove more beneficial for society as a whole.

In conclusion, consequentialism can, in certain situations, provide an ethical response that prioritizes the necessity of outcomes over strict adherence to the Golden Rule, which states: "Don't do to others what you don't want done to you" This principle, rooted in reciprocity and benevolence, may come into tension with exceptional circumstances where the consequences of an action outweigh the rigid application of moral principles.

In extreme contexts, such as war or crises, it may be necessary to take actions one would not normally consider—such as committing a violent act or making a seemingly unjust decision—to prevent a greater evil or protect a larger number of lives. Similarly, in everyday tense situations, we cannot always act with benevolence. There are times when, temporarily, we fail to treat others as we would like to be treated due to pressures or circumstances that push us to react differently. Consequentialism sometimes allows us to reconcile these morally questionable actions by justifying them through the necessity of positive results they aim to produce.

One might argue that, if I were in the place of the person mistreated in the name of a higher necessity, I would probably disagree with this choice. To that, I would respond that, of course, I would not be satisfied at the time. However, necessity being law, I could understand the logic behind this decision and, with hindsight, reconcile with the one who made it, knowing that I would probably have acted similarly in a similar situation. In such cases, this approach also provides a personal path to reconciliation with actions one would have preferred to avoid. When regrettable actions are perceived as necessary given the circumstances, it becomes possible to reconcile with them, knowing they were undertaken for a greater good. This perspective allows acceptance that, in moments of tension or conflict, it may be morally permissible to temporarily deviate from principles such as benevolence to minimize greater harm or preserve a certain balance.

Thus, consequentialism recognizes that in certain situations, whether in times of extreme crisis or in everyday tensions, the harm we are led to commit can be reconciled with our moral sense. This harm becomes justifiable if the positive consequences it produces aim to restore or preserve harmony, even if this requires a temporary violation of ethical principles we typically strive to uphold, such as benevolence or non-violence.

The Cause of Psychological Violence

Unlike the first issue, which visibly highlights the empirical cause, the second issue raises the question of the psychological cause, whose intangible origin is far more subtle to discern. It thus becomes more difficult to understand how a person, even in the absence of immediate empirical pressure or danger, might still adopt harmful behaviors.

In response, the pitfall of religious tradition, with its array of moral judgments, explains that humans are free to choose between good and evil. According to this view, there is no need to seek a cause for evil because we are naturally tempted by violence and coercion, as though evil were an integral part of us and had to be combated. Religion teaches that it is through the exercise of our freedom that we sometimes choose to commit harmful actions, for which we must answer to both human justice and God.

This view of freedom implies that harmful actions have no external cause, that they are in some way primary causes, resting on no other reason than the idea that evil resides intrinsically within us. In religious logic, since human beings cannot be equal to God, they cannot be the primary cause—a status reserved for God as the creator. But since evil must have a cause, religions have likely invented the devil for this purpose, a divine being who would serve as God's antagonist. However, this proposition remains flawed. If the cause of evil lies with the devil, this could effectively absolve humans of their harmful acts. Religion then faces a paradox: it places our responsibility at the level of temptation, but this logic is dialectical, for in granting us the capacity to choose between good and evil, it symbolically places us on the same level as the devil, with an almost divine status. From the moment we are responsible for this choice, our decision would not be motivated by any external cause, which would render us autonomous in exercising this power, like God himself.

This religious vision of freedom, which posits that human beings freely choose between good and evil without any external cause other than temptation, must be contextualized within psychology. If we consider that evil can be a reaction to external circumstances in the empirical cause, the same applies to the psychological cause. Here, apparent freedom is often obscured by internal forces that deeply influence decisions.

Indeed, in the case of violence stemming from psychological origins, an individual's decision-making center can be blinded by distorted representations of their internal core of suffering, acting as a veil that obstructs discernment. This suffering, although invisible, significantly reduces the possibility of a fully conscious and autonomous choice. Thus, the freedom that religion places at the heart of human moral responsibility is here deeply hindered by psychological wounds that determine behaviors, even if, on the surface, these actions may seem to be choices free from any empirical constraint.

A striking example of this psychological grip is illustrated in *Saving Private Ryan*. The young translator soldier, Upham, after being paralyzed by fear during combat and witnessing the deaths of his comrades, sees the battle turn in his camp's favor. At this moment, three German soldiers surrender to him, including the one he had previously convinced his captain to release. Driven by accumulated hatred and psychological suffering, he decides to arbitrarily kill this German prisoner. Although the immediate danger is gone and the soldiers

are unarmed, this scene shows how psychological weight—fear and anger—can obscure an individual's capacity to act rationally and morally.

Thus, even if freedom exists, it is here constrained by emotional and psychological forces that influence behavior. The core of internal suffering captures the individual's attention and traps them in a loop of reactivity, making it difficult to take the necessary step back to exercise true freedom. As in Upham's case, this suffering leads to destructive actions that may appear, on the surface, to be free choices but are in reality dictated by trauma.

Reconciliation, in this context, enables the liberation of this decision-making center from the grip of suffering, thereby paving the way for truly free and conscious action. Psychological suffering does not entirely negate freedom, but it temporarily veils its exercise, creating the illusion of constraints where, in reality, the individual can regain their autonomy once this grip is dissipated.

The Distinction Between the Two Causes and Their Cultural Lenses

The two causes—empirical and psychological—are not entirely independent and influence each other. However, culturally, they are not justified in the same way. Let us return to the example of the film *Saving Private Ryan*. In the first cause, the empirical one, the soldiers face a moral dilemma concerning the fate of the German prisoner. As a spectator, based on my morality and compassion, it would have seemed inadmissible and inhumane for the soldiers to coldly execute this prisoner. Yet, within the context of the laws of war, which prioritize the lives of one's own, his execution could have appeared justified. The act, though brutal, would have aimed to prevent the prisoner from later rejoining the fight and endangering their lives and those of other soldiers.

The director also seems to disapprove of this scenario by choosing to have the prisoner released. However, as the film progresses, he psychologically prepares us for a morally different outcome: the German prisoner, although spared and now free to move, rejoins his troops and takes up arms again against Upham's section. This act, although part of his duty as a soldier, is presented as a moral justification for his subsequent execution. At this point, it is no longer about military necessity but rather vengeance or punishment for having "misused" his release by returning to the fight.

And yet, this German soldier had merely done his duty by returning to combat, demonstrating courage in once again risking his life. At this moment, the script appears to condone his execution as a deserved punishment, in apparent alignment with Judeo-Christian morality, which links fault to sanction. However, upon reflection, this act constitutes a war crime because it was no longer motivated by legitimate necessity, unlike the first cause.

Nevertheless, the situation is not entirely antagonistic. The director also aligns with the second cause, that of violence stemming from psychological origins. On several occasions, he shows us Upham's fragility in the face of danger. Paralyzed by fear, he is unable to assist his comrades during a critical battle. This fear ultimately leads him to execute the prisoner,

but this act is not the result of a free choice. Here, there is neither freedom nor true moral decision-making, only a compulsive reaction dictated by psychological forces.

This distinction and interaction between the first cause (the empirical pressure of circumstances) and the second (psychological violence and vengeance) highlight the complexity of wartime actions and the difficulty of discerning the boundary between necessity and morality.

Reconciliation Through Awareness of Determinism

With this thought experiment referenced in the song *Né en 17 à Leidenstadt*, Jean-Jacques Goldman perfectly encapsulates, for me, the reconciling perspective I adopt in my reflections on analogous situations:

*"And if I had been born in '17 in Leidenstadt,
On the ruins of a battlefield,
Would I have been better or worse than those people,
If I had been German?"*

Goldman wonders how he would have reacted if born into a context of war, humiliation, and hatred. Would he have resisted the temptation of revenge, or would he have succumbed to hatred like so many others? This question echoes the problem of reconciliation with oneself and others, which I explore in my work. I am shaped by my environment, and it is difficult to know whether, in similar circumstances, I would have acted differently.

The song also addresses other contexts of violence, such as Northern Ireland or apartheid in South Africa, and poses the same question: would I have had the courage to extend a hand to the enemy, to betray my own for the sake of justice? Or would I have remained passive, complicit, or even a perpetrator, due to the pressures of my environment?

*"We'll never truly know what's inside us,
Hidden behind our appearances.
The soul of a hero, a complicit bystander, or a perpetrator?
The worst, or the most beautiful?
Would we be among those who resist, or merely sheep in a flock,*

If words alone were not enough?"

These lyrics highlight the uncertainty of my ability to resist the destructive forces surrounding me. They align with my reflection on how individuals' actions are most often reactions to empirical or psychological contexts, rather than truly free choices. The song raises a fundamental question: in extreme situations, would I have had the strength to resist hatred, or would I have become complicit?

Finally, the song's closing line, "And may you and I, if possible for a long time, be spared from having to choose a side," calls for prudence in judging others. It acknowledges that, in certain situations, it is hard to know how I would have reacted. This reconciling perspective, which accepts the determinism of human behavior, paradoxically initiates a process of liberation. By becoming aware of these influences, one can begin the process of overcoming them.

The Paradox of Essentialization

To address this paradox, I take the example of the Pélicot case—a stunning case in many respects that challenges my reflection on reconciliation. Something in the way this case is represented reveals a fundamental absurdity in the notion of moral guilt.

There is, of course, no debate about the facts themselves, but rather about how they are apprehended and the capacity to reconcile with the perpetrator. Here, the empirical cause does not provide a real explanation; instead, the psychological cause—with its factors related to religious culture and biographical trauma—sheds light on the situation.

During his trial, two statements by Dominique Pélicot highlight the paradox:

- *"I am a rapist."*
- *"No one is born perverse; one becomes so."*

These statements reveal a fundamental tension in how guilt is perceived. The prosecution seems to want to minimize the impact of his childhood traumas, which would nonetheless have shaped his perverse behavior. But why? To prove that he is a rapist? This logic aligns with the absurdity of religious guilt, which suggests he failed to resist perversion. But as I explained earlier, if the perpetrator must "resist evil," this implies that evil is inherent in him, that he was born perverse. In that case, he would not be responsible for his condition, since he did not choose this essence.

Similarly, the accusation of patriarchy, which suggests his behavior was dictated by this culture, seems equally absurd. If his actions are the product of this culture, then it would no longer be the responsibility of men but of the culture itself. But this culture, created by men,

presupposes that, in their essence, they are rapists. This would mean no longer considering their freedom of choice and, consequently, their responsibility.

The paradox of essentialization, whether religious or ideological in origin, excessively simplifies the influences that shape an individual. By reducing the other to an essence, we lock ourselves into a contradiction, thereby closing the path to reconciliation. Worse still, we perpetuate the cycle of violence. This cycle takes root in the thirst for revenge, as essentialization reinforces the idea that the other is intrinsically evil, that they must be banished from humanity, with no possibility of transformation. This approach not only deprives the individual of the essence of their humanity but perpetuates a pattern of violence and resentment that prevents any form of genuine forgiveness or reconciliation.

To break free from this paradox, it is necessary to recognize the multiplicity of factors that influence human behavior and abandon this simplistic vision, which, instead of restoring peace, perpetuates conflict.

Evidence of the Psychological Cause

Suicide and addiction starkly illustrate the destructive power of the psychological cause. Unlike the empirical forces, which are visible and tangible, the psychological cause operates silently, working from within yet with a potency that defies comprehension. By subtly ensnaring the subject's mind, this cause eventually abolishes any semblance of freedom of choice, rendering the individual's actions as harmful to themselves as they are to others.

When psychological suffering sets in, it becomes an insidious force, capable of driving an individual to acts of self-destruction, whether through suicide—a definitive act—or addiction, a more gradual descent into self-loss. This suffering does not merely inflict pain; it saturates the mind, gradually distorting perception and judgment. Far from being a fleeting torment, it reorganizes thoughts, imposes its own paradigms, and alters the individual's perception of reality, leading them to view the destructive act—suicide—as the only conceivable escape from their anguish. Free will, in this scenario, becomes a tragic illusion, as the subject, shackled by their suffering, sees no alternative but to yield to its grip. In the case of addiction, suffering transforms into a desperate quest for compensation, where desire overtakes reason, eclipsing any concern for the consequences to one's health.

Gradually, this suffering infiltrates every corner of consciousness, diverting the individual's ability to reason clearly. The trapped mind seeks justifications for its torment, projecting blame either onto itself or onto others. In the case of suicide, the individual ultimately convinces themselves that their own existence is the source of the pain and that ending their life is the only way to remedy it. Similarly, this suffering can drive acts of vengeance or destruction against others if the subject comes to perceive others as responsible for their anguish. The rationalization of harmful acts, whether directed inward or outward, becomes a survival mechanism—a way of assigning meaning to a seemingly insurmountable ordeal.

Under this influence, freedom of choice becomes an illusion; thoughts, judgments, and actions are now dictated by suffering that has seized control of the mind. What appears to be an act of will—suicide—is, in reality, the result of inner coercion, an unyielding pressure exerted by unresolved suffering.

Suicide, far from being an act of freedom, is the ultimate evidence that the psychological cause can surpass all other forces. It demonstrates how suffering, when it overtakes the mind and reorganizes perceived reality, can annihilate an individual's ability to make clear decisions. The suicidal act tragically reveals that, when suffering is neither understood nor reconciled, the psychological force can lead to irreversible consequences, driving individuals to actions they would never have contemplated in a healthy state of mind.

Thus, suicide is the quintessential example of the dominance of the psychological cause over the individual. Under the influence of suffering, the individual loses their freedom of choice and is compelled to rationalize harmful behaviors toward themselves, and sometimes toward others. This invisible yet omnipresent force demonstrates that psychological factors can be a sufficient cause to compel destructive acts, proving that internal forces can be as powerful—if not more so—than empirical constraints.

2. Introduction to Idealism Before Addressing Its Perspective

Historical Background of Idealism¹

The Presocratics :

Idealism finds its roots in the Presocratics, over two and a half millennia ago, with the first concepts that shaped it. Among them, Parmenides (6th–5th century BCE) proposed that Being is unique, immutable, and eternal. True reality never changes, and everything that appears to us as diversity and movement in the sensible world is mere illusion. Only reason can grasp this truth.

His disciple, Zeno of Elea (6th–5th century BCE), formulated famous paradoxes to demonstrate that movement and plurality are mere logical illusions. Following Parmenides' teaching, he sought to prove that reality is unchanging and singular, and that our sensory perceptions deceive us. Both thinkers champion the primacy of reason over the senses and reject the notion that change or multiplicity can be real.

¹ Non-exhaustive list

The Idealists :

The ideal of reason resonates further in the philosophy of Plato (428–348 BCE), who asserts that Ideas or immaterial Forms are the only true reality, with the sensible world being only an imperfect copy. These transcendent realities are accessible through reason.

Later, George Berkeley (1685–1753) advanced the idea that "to be is to be perceived" (*esse est percipi*). For Berkeley, material reality exists only in perception. Everything that exists is an idea in the mind of individuals or in the mind of God.

For Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), we can know only phenomena—that is, reality as it appears to us through the structures of our mind (space, time, and the categories of understanding). In his *Critique of Pure Reason*, he maintains that reality in itself (the noumenon) remains inaccessible to our knowledge.

Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814) introduced absolute idealism in the 18th century, asserting that reality is nothing more than a creation of the ego. The spirit or absolute ego is the sole fundamental reality, and the external world is a projection of the ego—reality is created by the mind.

Friedrich Schelling (1775–1854) proposed a unity between Spirit and Nature, both being manifestations of the same absolute reality. Nature is nothing but Spirit in the process of becoming, and Spirit realizes itself through nature.

Finally, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) conceived of all reality as a manifestation of the Absolute Spirit, which develops dialectically through history.

The Heirs of Idealism :

Thinkers like Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), the founder of phenomenology, inherited and transformed this tradition. Husserl sought to describe phenomena as they appear to consciousness, without presupposing, as Kant did, the ontological question of the existence of an independent reality. For Husserl, intentional consciousness is always directed toward an object, and it is through this intentionality that reality is constituted for the subject. He is often associated with a form of transcendental idealism, asserting that reality is always given through subjective experience.

Silo (1938–2010), a thinker of New Humanism, explored the depths of the human being through intentionality and the perspective of an active consciousness that constructs reality, aligning himself with the phenomenological tradition. He viewed the individual as a being capable of creating meaning not only through the act of perceiving but, more importantly, through personal and social transformation. For Silo, true liberation lies in overcoming resentment and reconciling with oneself and others, breaking the cycle of psychological determinism and opening the path to a truly meaningful existence. He advocated for the importance of experience and humble meditation, enabling one to transform the meaninglessness of life into fulfillment and access the sacred spaces of human consciousness.

All these thinkers, though vastly different, share a central idea: ultimate reality is connected to reason, spirit, or ideas, rather than raw matter as perceived by the senses.

Idealism for Me

I have not cited these authors as arguments of authority to justify my affinity with idealism but rather to show that its resistance to time and conformity highlights its seemingly immanent and universal nature. Idealism emphasizes that it resides deeply within human reflection, independent of external authority, and represents an intrinsic perspective in our understanding of the world. Idealism is not merely a collection of hyperphysical or epistemological theories but, above all, a methodology of reflection practiced through dialectical reasoning—an approach that each person already engages in at an embryonic level when they weigh the pros and cons of a decision or assess the cognitive validity of a phenomenon.

This immanent nature of questioning the perception of reality has been particularly evident in my personal history, as I have already recounted in my writing on the suspension of the self. This awakening of consciousness began very early, around the age of ten:

I was walking alone in the woods, reflecting on the experience of being isolated in this natural environment. I became aware that I was the only human present to observe this forest. I surmised that, because of this, nature could only exist through my presence in that place. I closed my eyes, wondering if the surroundings would continue to exist without my observation, without the consciousness that, ontologically, things exist. Then, cautiously, I advanced with my eyes closed. As I stepped, the ground beneath me cracked with the sound of twigs breaking, and my hands, reaching out blindly, touched textures I recognized as ferns and grasses.²

Reflecting on this episode, I realize that it aligns with a purpose I am discovering gradually, something striving to fulfill itself from within. Today, nearly 50 years later, as I delve into this philosophy, I understand that idealism grapples with these same questions and has done so for more than two millennia. This was not a contingent inquiry but the result of the intentionality of consciousness, emerging slowly from its long slumber of sensory certainties³. Apart from a few moments of lucidity, such as the one I just described, this purpose was not always evident but has been co-present with me since birth. It fully manifested when I became aware of a fundamental paradox: a posteriori, the act of consciousness and the self as an object of consciousness are not sensory phenomena, whereas the substance of the objects I perceive in the world is. This determination is merely a construction of the cognitive apparatus of consciousness, as is its very concept of existence—nothing more than one of its determinations.

² Antoine Batt - Prelude to the invocation Memories or reflections on the suspension of the self - p 11

³ In *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel introduces "sense-certainty" as the immediate experience of the world through the senses, where the individual believes they perceive reality directly and objectively. However, for Hegel, this certainty is illusory, as what is perceived is always mediated by consciousness, and the immediacy that sense-certainty claims to offer is, in reality, abstract and insufficient for grasping the true nature of reality.

Thus, I discovered, astonished, that this reflection from my childhood was not as irrelevant as I had once thought. Today, this same reflection radically redefines my place in the universe: I have transitioned from being a microscopic point lost in the vastness of the universe to its center, or even to the origin of its creation.

Kant compared this cognitive shift to the "Copernican Revolution":

*Copernicus, who could not satisfactorily explain the celestial movements by assuming that the entire host of stars revolved around the observer, attempted to see whether he might not succeed better by making the observer revolve and leaving the stars at rest. Similarly, in metaphysics, one can make (B XVII) an analogous attempt concerning the intuition of objects. If intuition were to conform solely to the nature of objects, I do not see how we could know anything of them a priori. Conversely, if the object (as an object of the senses) conforms to the nature of our faculty of intuition, I can easily conceive of such a possibility.*⁴

Husserl revisited Kant's famous metaphor of the "Copernican Revolution," reframing it as the "Copernican Reversal." While Kant referred to an epistemological revolution, Husserl seems to highlight a subreption embedded within Copernicus' heliocentric conception. By displacing consciousness as the starting point of observation, Copernicus decentered it, influenced by his bias toward sensory certainty.

*However, intentional psychology—albeit implicitly—already contains the transcendental within itself. It requires only a final awakening to accomplish the Copernican Reversal, which alters nothing in the content of its results but instead reveals their ultimate meaning. One might also say that psychology ultimately faces just one fundamental problem: the concept of the soul.*⁵

Although he cannot be strictly classified as an idealist, as he is more commonly identified as a dualist, I find it essential to mention Descartes. His approach is, in many respects, akin to that of an idealist, particularly in his formulation of the famous "*cogito ergo sum*" ("I think, therefore I am"). In his *Meditations on First Philosophy*, Descartes undertakes a sort of phenomenological reduction, systematically setting aside everything that can be doubted. He begins with the external world and proceeds to question his perception of his own body and senses. Once everything doubtful has been eliminated, what remains is the consciousness of being and thinking—an absolute ontological certainty. From this certainty, this indubitable reference point, Descartes constructs his entire philosophy. Similarly, I align myself with this approach, adopting this certainty as the foundation for all my reflections today.

"So then, what am I? Am I not at least something? But I have already denied that I possess any senses or any body. Nevertheless, I hesitate, for what follows from that? Am I so dependent on the body and the senses that I cannot exist without them? Yet I have convinced myself that there is absolutely nothing in the world, no heavens, no earth, no minds, nor any bodies; have I not also persuaded myself that I do not exist? No indeed: I was certainly something, if I convinced myself of anything—or merely if I thought something. But there is some very powerful and cunning deceiver who is deliberately deceiving me all

⁴Immanuel Kant - Critique of Pure Reason - B XVII

⁵ Edmund Husserl - p 126 Méditations Cartésiennes- LIBRAIRIE PHILOSOPHIQUE J. VRIN 1966

*the time. There is, then, no doubt that I exist, if he is deceiving me; and let him deceive me as much as he will, he can never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think that I am something. So, after considering everything very thoroughly, I must finally conclude that this proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind."*⁶

*"On the contrary, now I know not only that I exist as a thinking thing but also that a certain idea of a corporeal nature presents itself to my mind. This makes me doubt whether this nature that thinks, which is within me—or rather, by which I am what I am—is different from this corporeal nature, or whether the two are one and the same thing. At this point, I have no reason to persuade myself more of one than the other: from which it follows that I am entirely indifferent to denying or affirming it, or even abstaining from making any judgment about it."*⁷

From the certainty of my self-awareness, contrasted with the contingency of the perceived world, I became aware of an a posteriori paradox: what I once regarded as a sensible certainty, such as the substance of matter, proved to be uncertain, while my being, though imperceptible to the senses, revealed itself with absolute certainty concerning the existence of its own substance.

As a result, I came to consider that two distinct universes could not exist: one material and mortal, and the other immaterial and therefore immortal. If the material world is contingent and mortal, it cannot be the source of the necessary intelligible or its immortality. To illustrate this permanence, we intuitively assign a name to the being but not to the body, for the body is destined to transform, while the being remains immutable. This is how a fundamental reversal in my conception of reality took place. Reality is no longer what my senses allow me to perceive, but the transcendental a priori of my understanding⁸, which not only conditions all experience but also constitutes the first cause of the impulses guiding my mind.

I tell myself that the only thing I am absolutely certain of is that "I am," that "I think." Everything else—the material world, what my senses perceive—might be illusory, but this consciousness of being is indubitable. It is from this certainty that everything is constructed. What I mean is that, according to the Cartesian principle of certainty (*cogito ergo sum*), if my self-consciousness is the only thing I can be certain of, then it is this consciousness that gives form to everything I perceive. The material world, what we call "reality," is ultimately just a projection of consciousness—a construct entirely dependent on it in the Kantian sense⁹. In other words, it is consciousness that, acting through schemas or mental forms, shapes what we see, hear, and feel as experience. Matter is merely a manifestation of consciousness. And here lies a fundamental difference: matter is mutable, perishable, it comes into being and ceases to exist. But consciousness is always present—immutable and

⁶ René Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy*, section [19]

⁷ René Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy*, section [69]

⁸ Concept developed by Kant in *Critique of Pure Reason*, designating the preconditions for all experience, inherent to the understanding, which make possible the organization of phenomena within the pure intuitions of space and time.

⁹ In Kant's philosophy, the understanding is the faculty through which the mind produces concepts and organizes sensory intuitions (perceptions) to form judgments. Unlike intuition, which provides sensory data within the frameworks of time and space, the understanding structures these data through categories, fundamental concepts such as causality or substance. These categories are a priori, meaning they preexist experience and enable the mind to render the world intelligible.

intangible, like a constant source of laws such as those governing physics. What is even more striking is that consciousness has a subjective nature: it does not depend on the senses; it is directly experienced. Matter, on the other hand, is always perceived through the senses; it is mediated, filtered by our perceptions. This gives rise to a profound paradox: how can something subjective, like consciousness, originate from matter, which is perceived externally and through the senses? If consciousness is directly experienced and unmediated, it seems illogical to think that this profound subjectivity could be generated by something considered material—a substance that is always mediated and perceived externally. It would be akin to claiming that something immaterial and intangible, like consciousness, could arise from something limited and tangible, like matter. *Ipso facto*, if matter is changeable and the structure of consciousness is stable, it becomes more logical to think that consciousness is the origin—the first cause. It is not matter that gives rise to consciousness but rather consciousness that, through its activity and subjective nature, brings forth what we might call the demiurgic world¹⁰.

In fact, consciousness does not passively endure the world; it universally creates it. That is why, in my view, the universe, as we perceive it, exists because consciousness is its primary source. Without consciousness, there would be no world to conceive.

3. The Path from Understanding to Reconciliation

Discovering Unconditioned Impulses

*When we come to understand that it is not an enemy residing within us, but rather a being filled with hopes and failures—a being in which we see, in a fleeting sequence of images, beautiful moments of fulfillment alongside moments of frustration and resentment—and when we come to understand that our enemy, too, is a being who has lived through hopes and failures, a being who has experienced moments of fulfillment and moments of frustration and resentment, we then adopt a humanizing perspective on the skin of monstrosity.*¹¹

In this passage, Silo seems to highlight the fundamental error of essentializing faults, whether in ourselves or others. A person who steals is not inherently a thief, a person who acts violently is not inherently a violent person, and a person who commits a heinous act is not inherently monstrous. If this were the case, it would also require essentializing individuals based on their good actions. Such rigid and contradictory labeling prevents any form of reconciliation and confines individuals to a fixed definition of their actions. In the previous chapter, we established that our freedom of choice does not pertain to reactive

¹⁰ In Platonic philosophy, the Demiurge is the divine craftsman who shapes the material world by drawing inspiration from ideal forms. He does not create from nothing but rather organizes preexisting matter based on the perfect and eternal models of the world of Ideas, as explained in Plato's dialogue *Timaeus*.

¹¹ Silo Punta de Vacas 2007.

behaviors, regardless of their cause, and that if a cause determines an action, it thereby abolishes individual responsibility. So where, then, does responsibility lie? Silo proposes in the following passage that responsibility follows from understanding.

"Reconciliation is not about forgetting or forgiving; it is about acknowledging everything that has happened and resolving to step out of the cycle of resentment. It involves taking a reflective look, recognizing errors in oneself and in others. Reconciliation with oneself means resolving not to walk the same path twice but being willing to repair the damage caused, even doubly so. However, it is clear that we cannot demand those who have wronged us to repair doubly the harm they have caused us. Nonetheless, it is beneficial to help them see the chain of harm their actions have set into motion in their own lives. Doing so reconciles us with those we previously saw as enemies, even if this does not lead to their reconciliation with us, for that is part of the destiny of their actions, over which we have no control."

In this passage, Silo explains that reconciliation is based on an awareness of errors, both our own and those of others. This awareness enables us to break free from the cycle of resentment. Unlike reconciliation based on forgiveness or forgetting, this process is rooted in a deep understanding of our behaviors and their consequences. This kind of reconciliation does not produce impulses in the conventional sense but allows them to manifest spontaneously as unconditioned impulses, which serve as true first causes, creating meaning and ushering in a new reality.

In this context, unconditioned impulses are not reactions but autonomous expressions of the individual's true essence, liberated once awareness is achieved. Silo appears to suggest that responsibility emerges from this understanding. This responsibility is expressed through two impulses, which are not the result of an external cause but rather the direct manifestation of an intention for inner transformation.

First Unconditioned Impulse: The Recognition of One's True Essence

This first impulse arises when an individual attains a deep awareness and recognizes their true essence, beyond the mistakes they may have made. The impulse does not stem from a chain of causes but emerges spontaneously once the individual frees themselves from the illusion of being defined by their past actions. At this moment, the individual's true essence is revealed. The recognition of this essence releases an emotional impulse free from judgment, signifying a break with the cycle of resentment.

The individual ceases to perceive others and themselves through the lenses of fault or guilt. They no longer see perpetrators, but rather victims of circumstances and forces beyond their control. This new perspective is accompanied by an intense energy that often manifests cathartically: the individual weeps, not out of sadness, but out of relief, as they break away from their former perceptions and rediscover their capacity to love. The unconditioned impulse, as a first cause, does not require an external event to generate it; it is the natural result of a return to the individual's deeper essence.

The first impulse does not arise in response to constraint or effort. It is spontaneous because it is intrinsic to the nature of being once freed from conditioning. This impulse creates a leap in consciousness—a breaking point with the determinisms of the former self—and directs the

individual toward reconciliation. This reconciliation is not based on forgiving others but on an inner transformation that renders hatred or resentment obstacles that have been overcome.

Second Unconditioned Impulse: Transformation Through Understanding

The second impulse is not a reaction to the first but another expression of the same first cause: understanding. This impulse is cognitive in nature and arises from the inner certainty that, once awareness is achieved, repeating the same mistakes becomes impossible. The individual now clearly comprehends the real causes of their past behaviors, and this understanding brings about a lasting transformation of the mind.

Once again, it is crucial to emphasize that this impulse is not the result of a moral choice or an effort of will. Awareness, as the first cause, provokes a change that makes the repetition of past errors impossible. The individual no longer needs to impose a moral code upon themselves; understanding itself spontaneously guides their actions along a different path. This impulse does not have a cause in the empirical sense of the term; like the first impulse, it emerges from the individual's deeper essence, which has fully integrated understanding. This change is irreversible, as Silo expresses: *"From there, your fall will be unlikely, unless your will is to descend into darker regions to bring light to the shadows."*¹² Once understanding is achieved, it guides the individual toward a new way of living and perceiving the world, without requiring them to struggle or force this transformation.

Thus, this impulse is not an external response to stimuli or constraints but the natural culmination of awareness, which itself is a first cause. Reconciliation no longer involves merely avoiding reactive behaviors but acting naturally in accordance with this new understanding.

Unconditioned impulses are neither responses to external causes nor reactions to internal stimuli. Instead, they embody an intentionality aimed at inner transformation, serving as a schema to shape responses to the obstacles encountered in the Spirit's process of actualization.

Silo demonstrates that reconciliation begins with this profound understanding, which itself constitutes a first cause. The impulses—whether emotional or cognitive—are the natural expressions of this divine essence being liberated, leading the individual toward a lasting and authentic reconciliation with themselves and with others.

Clarification on Schemata

Unconditioned impulses are neither responses to external causes nor reactions to internal stimuli. Rather, they embody an intentionality directed toward inner transformation, serving as a structure or guiding schema for shaping responses to the obstacles encountered in the Spirit's process of actualization.

¹² The Last of the Inner States – Silo – The Healing of Suffering – The Inner Look

Schemata According to Kant:

*"Thus, it is evident that there must be a third element that is homogeneous on the one hand with the category, and on the other hand with the phenomenon, making the application of the former to the latter possible. This intermediary representation must be pure (free of all empirical elements) and yet, on the one side, intellectual and, on the other, sensible. Such is the transcendental schema. The concept of the understanding contains the pure synthetic unity of the manifold in general. Time, as the formal condition of the manifold in inner sense and thus of the connection of all representations, contains a manifold a priori in pure intuition. Now, a transcendental determination of time is homogeneous with the category (which constitutes its unity), in that it is universal and rests on an a priori rule. On the other hand, it is homogeneous with the phenomenon in that time is contained in every empirical representation of the manifold. Consequently, the application of the category to phenomena is made possible by the transcendental determination of time, which, as the schema of the concepts of the understanding, mediates the subsumption of phenomena under the category."*¹³

From the perspective of transcendental idealism in Kant's philosophy, schemata (or transcendental schemata) play a crucial role in his epistemology, particularly in the Critique of Pure Reason. It is through schemata that the categories of the understanding (pure concepts such as causality and substance) are linked to sensible intuitions (the data of experience that we perceive in space and time). Schemata act as mediators between the categories of the understanding (such as causality, substance, etc.) and sensible intuitions (what we perceive in space and time). They enable the application of categories to sensory perceptions, thus making experience possible. In other words, schemata allow the mind to synthesize perceptions by applying categories to them—without which, a structured experience of the world would not exist.

Schemata are necessary because our concepts (or categories) are too abstract to be directly applied to sensory perceptions. For example, the concept of causality does not exist in the mere perception of an object; it must be applied by the understanding. The schema of causality is what allows the mind to organize the relationship between an event and its cause over time. Without schemata, the categories of the understanding could not be applied to perceived objects. For instance, the schema of substance enables us to think of an object as persisting through time despite changes.

For example, **Descartes' wax experiment** illustrates how knowledge does not rely on the senses but on the understanding. When a piece of wax is brought near a flame, it transitions from a solid to a liquid state, altering all its sensible properties—its shape, texture, smell, and temperature. Yet, we continue to recognize it as the same wax. This paradox reveals that it is not through the senses that we grasp the substance of the wax, since all its sensible qualities change, but rather through the **understanding**, which apprehends its underlying essence. This experiment supports Descartes' idea that the true perception of things does not depend on sensory impressions but on thought, which alone is capable of comprehending the identity and continuity of objects through their transformations.

Kant calls this process transcendental schematism. It is a mechanism through which the

¹³ Immanuel Kant - Critique of Pure Reason - Section [B177] to [B179]

understanding imposes order on sensory perceptions via schemata, allowing objects to be conceived under universal concepts such as causality, quantity, or substance.

The schema is neither a mere perception (a sensory intuition) nor an abstract concept. It is a rule or a mental structure that enables the application of a concept to an object of experience. It functions as a sort of "model" or "organizational rule" that guides the understanding in applying categories.

The schema of causality, for example, allows the mind to apply the category of causality to perceived successive events, thus enabling an organized experience structured in terms of cause-effect relations. Without this schema, events would merely be raw, unstructured data.

The schema of substance, similarly, enables us to conceive of something as persisting through time, even if its properties change. For instance, a tree that loses its leaves in autumn remains the same tree because its substance persists.

Kant emphasizes that schemata are essential for the categories of understanding to be applicable to the objects of sensory experience. Without schemata, we would only have a juxtaposition of perceptions without coherence or conceptual unity. It is thanks to schemata that our perceptions become meaningful, that is, they can be understood under universal concepts such as causality or substance.

Kant's schemata and Silo's mental form share interesting similarities, even though they belong to different philosophical contexts. In Kant's system, transcendental schemata are subtle mechanisms that allow the understanding to organize sensory phenomena and render them intelligible. They function as bridges between sensory intuition and the categories of the understanding, ensuring the coherence of our experience of the world. Similarly, in Silo's thought, the mental form acts as a filter through which consciousness perceives and interprets reality, influencing our reactions and behaviors. It conditions our way of thinking and acting by structuring our mental perceptions.

However, although these two concepts can be compared in their mediating function between the mind and the world, it is important to note that Silo's mental form is more flexible and more evolving. While Kant's schemata are rigid, universal, and static, Silo's mental forms are dynamic, shaped by personal experience, and capable of transformation. This dimension brings them closer to Hegel's dynamic conception of Spirit. Hegel conceives of Spirit as being in perpetual motion, developing through dialectical processes—thesis, antithesis, and synthesis—toward a higher self-awareness. Similarly, in Silo's thought, mental forms are not fixed; they change as the individual progresses in their quest for reconciliation and inner freedom.

Thus, while Kant's schemata and Silo's mental forms appear to share a similar structural role, it is within Hegel's dynamic approach that mental forms find their true resonance. They embody this constant movement of inner transformation, this struggle to overcome the contradictions that bind the individual, and this potential for reconciliation that leads toward a freer and more conscious existence.

As explained by Silo's School in Mental Discipline¹⁴:

"We can thus observe the mental form, this act-object structure. Until now, we had seen objects, but now we must observe the mental form. It is not a representation, it is not an image. So, what is it? It is something in which I am placed. It is this enclosure of my consciousness that moves within certain parameters. But it is not a representation..."

This description highlights the idea that the mental form is a dynamic structure, constantly interacting with acts of consciousness and the objects they target. Far from being a fixed representation, it reflects an active organization of consciousness itself. This formulation naturally connects the theoretical explanation of schemata and mental form with Silo's citation, while reinforcing the idea of the internal dynamism of the mental form.

4. Reason or Reflective Mind as an Autonomous Process

In Kant's philosophy, practical reason is free; it operates unconditionally in the realm of morality. The will obeys the moral law (categorical imperative) without being determined by sensory phenomena, which demonstrates its autonomy. It is not reactive to external events but functions by itself, spontaneously, like a schema. This reflective activity is therefore an unconditioned impulse, as it does not depend on external stimuli to manifest. It is a universal project of humanity that allows for an understanding of its past and gives meaning to its present.

Kant explains that practical reason is autonomous insofar as it follows an internal law (the categorical imperative) without being caused by desires or empirical factors. Similarly, when it operates, it does not depend on sensory stimuli or external causes but is an impulse that spontaneously emerges from the nature of the mind. This is why inclinations and prejudices of the self must be suspended, as they risk disturbing the purity of this rational impulse and diverting the mind from its capacity to judge freely.

This ability to reflect, analyze, and judge occurs without any prior cause. In this sense, reflective reason could be considered an unconditioned impulse that guides the mind in its process of understanding and reflection.

¹⁴ Silo, Mental Discipline, a work from the School of Thought of Silo (Humanist Movement). This text is part of the internal disciplines aimed at developing active consciousness and achieving self-mastery through spiritual and mental practices, rooted in a phenomenological and humanist approach.

5. The Dialectical Journey Toward Reconciliation

The Initial Confrontation with Conflict

As I have described in the empirical and psychological causes, we have seen that conflict is an inevitable element in an individual's life, whether internal or external. The paradigms that an individual constructs are shaped by the learning they derive from their cultural environment and personal experiences. It is through these experiences that schemata, initially established by the mind, take form and confront reality. However, these schemata, though rooted in an initial structure, do not appear to be fixed. They seem to evolve not as new creations but as successive revelations, much like an archaeologist who, layer by layer, uncovers preexisting and profound structures. It is not the structures themselves that are dynamic but rather the work of the archaeologist who, with patience, unveils them. The dialectical journey thus begins with this first act, almost instinctive, where the mind, nourished by these paradigms, projects its ideals into the future—those intangible and luminous figures that secretly shape every action. These are aspirations forged through the interaction between cultural heritage and personal perceptions, always influenced by the environment the mind has shaped for itself, yet tending toward a future realization. There is, in this initial momentum, a purity, a force. The individual, guided by an innate confidence in the possibility of realizing these ideals, moves forward into the present with the energy of a dreamer, one who believes the world will respond to their aspirations. However, as this individual progresses, they encounter a reality more complex than the one they had idealized. It is at this point that the unveiling of schemata takes place.

In Kant's philosophy, schemata are universal mental structures that organize and structure our experience. They appear fixed, rigid, like bridges between intuition and the categories of the understanding. However, in many respects, these schemata do not seem entirely static; their comprehension is not fixed once and for all but evolves—not in the sense that they transform, but rather in the sense that they are progressively unveiled through our experience, within the dialectical process.

As a critical reflection, it is important to distinguish between the evolution of the understanding of schemata and their inherent nature. Whereas Kant conceives of schemata as universal and fixed structures, Hegel seems to attribute an evolving character to these same structures, in my view, thereby conflating the dialectical process of discovery with a transformation of the schemata themselves. In reality, it is not the schema that changes, but rather our understanding of it over the course of our experiences. If Hegel considers the evolution of ideas as a progression of reality itself, this perspective can be interpreted as a confusion between the evolution of thought and the stability of mental structures in themselves. From a Kantian perspective, schemata are not dynamic, but our awareness of their role is, progressively revealing itself through experiences and the dialectical process. It is as if one were to claim that the Earth, several thousand years ago, was flat and later transformed into a sphere. The Earth did not change—rather, our knowledge of its actual shape evolved. Similarly, schemata are immutable, but our consciousness of their nature develops over time. In this sense, I align with Parmenides and Zeno, who reject the idea that change or multiplicity is real, while also finding common ground with Hegel regarding the dynamism of Spirit. Reality itself is fixed and unchanging; only cognition, which plays a

dynamic role, evolves in its apprehension. This reflection also leads me back to the work of Mental Discipline, where the relationship between the dynamic nature of consciousness—structured as act/object, movement, and form—and the fixity of non-movement-form as a universal structure seems highly relevant. Consciousness, much like in Hegelian dialectics, provokes movement, but what it unveils through this dynamism is a reality that itself remains constant. To this, we must add that the antagonisms of internal and external conflicts, far from being mere obstacles, are in fact negative elements that contribute to a broader and fundamentally positive process. These are forces that, while creating ruptures and tensions, enable consciousness to progress toward a deeper reconciliation, both with itself and with others. These conflicts, which at first glance appear destructive or paralyzing, actually serve as triggers for necessary realizations, leading to inner unification. Thus, in the dialectical process I describe, these oppositions—whether psychological or empirical—serve to unveil the hidden truths of being and compel the individual to re-evaluate their schemata and paradigms. Reconciliation is therefore not an absence of conflict but rather the culmination of a process where negative elements are reintegrated into a richer, more complete synthesis. This journey leads to unification, not in spite of conflicts, but because of them.

In Hegel's philosophy, the final stage of the development of consciousness is that of Absolute Spirit (Geist). Absolute Spirit represents the ultimate reconciliation between individual consciousness and total reality, where consciousness attains a complete understanding of itself as an expression of the totality of Being. This is the stage where Spirit fully realizes its unity with the Universe, after having passed through the stages of individual consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, and finally objective Spirit (society, ethics, etc.). This dialectical process culminates in Absolute Spirit, where internal contradictions are resolved, and reality is perceived as a unified whole, often expressed through art, religion, and philosophy.

Conclusion

Reconciliation, both on a personal and collective level, is a profoundly dialectical process. This work has demonstrated that conflicts should not be seen solely as destructive elements or sources of division but rather as crucial stages in the transformation and unification of being. Through the confrontation with its ideals and their failures, the individual can uncover a deeper truth about themselves and the nature of reality.

The concepts derived from Kant's transcendental idealism, Hegel's dynamic Spirit, and Silo's reflections on intentionality help illuminate this process of reconciliation. These philosophical tools reveal that reconciliation is not merely a return to a previous state of harmony but rather a movement toward a broader, more unified, and more authentic consciousness.

A Look Toward the Future

If reconciliation extends beyond the individual sphere to encompass society as a whole, it could become an essential key to the future of our humanity. At a time when armed conflicts, ideological divisions, and cultural tensions are omnipresent, reconciliation appears as both a bold and necessary approach to restoring unity. On a societal scale, it could mean reintroducing dialogue where it has been broken and fostering a collective effort to understand differences rather than exacerbate them.

What would a society look like where, instead of engaging in polarization, individuals sought reconciliation both with themselves and with others? This could open new avenues for reflection on how to build bridges between divided communities, how to cultivate empathy and solidarity in the face of otherness.

In a world where dogmatism and rigid certainties often fuel ostracization, reconciliation offers an alternative path: one of unity in diversity, not as a utopian ideal, but as a daily project that begins with an effort of mutual understanding between antagonisms. A reconciled future is one where conflicts are not denied but resolved in a continuous movement toward a more coherent humanity, a universal human nation, capable of overcoming its internal contradictions in pursuit of lasting peace.

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